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WESTERN PERSPECTIVES ON CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN SOVIET ERA
by Walter Sawatsky
Dr. Walter Sawatsky, Professor of Church History & Mission at Associated Mennonite
Biblical Seminary, Elkhart IN has been co-editor of REE since 1997. The following paper
was presented at a Baptist Historical Conference in Moscow, co-sponsored by the Russian
Baptist Union and the State University of the Humanities (Moscow) in April 2011. Other
papers may appear shortly, abstracts in Russian were published for the conference.
Introduction
Many scholars have pointed out that religion, viewed by sociologists as a “sacred canopy”
for world views has always been a formative factor in the social order.  The key concepts of religion1
concentrate on a world view to live by, on making sense of the relationship between human life
with its uncertainties, and God (or gods in comparative religious terms). There have usually been
religious practices and rituals to sustain the basic religious understandings of the social order,
which were regularly reformed in response to major societal changes.2
In the long drawn out process of modernization, where one thinks of the shift from
thinking of the ruler as God ordained (Divine Right of Kings) to a state structure rationally
organized to oversee many functions and the decision makers were responsible to those they ruled
(i.e. a democratic understanding), there were changes in assumptions involving government, and
changes in assumptions involving religion. Those changes proceeded unevenly, were not
harmonious, or there were even outright clashes. Keeping some of those patterns in mind helps us
locate the distinct experience during the Soviet era.
The most obvious point of distinction, was the persistent assumption by the majority of
Soviet officials in power, that religion and religious social institutions had become irrelevant,
belonged in the dustbin of history.   Yet the most striking recognition at the end of the 20  century,3 th
not only within the former Soviet Union but globally, was that religious belief, practice, and societal
influence had not only survived, but had increased in significance. Had the Soviet leadership
misread historical development, or did their actions stimulate a vigorous reaction? That can be
debated, but it would be accurate to say that the Bolshevik reading of the future of religion relied
on a western secularization understanding of the historical trajectory prevalent in the late 19th
century. It was a positivist form of secular thinking that they  adopted and stayed frozen to.
Whereas in western Europe the transformations of the century resulted in a series of major shifts
in social theory throughout the 20  century, these rarely influenced Communist Party policyth
toward religion. On the contrary, as Anderson’s relatively recent (1994) systematic study of Soviet
 I am thinking in the tradition of the writings Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch, especially the latter’s Social1
Teaching of the Christian Churches (1911), although a handy reference from later generations of sociologists of religion is Peter
L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. Garden City, New York: Anchor, 1969.
 A current widely cited up to date theoretical treatment, is Paul Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews. An2
Anthropological Understanding of How People Change. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008.
 This is the finding from the careful study by John Anderson, Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union and3
Successor States, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Anderson’s work, referred to frequently below, marked
the first more thorough examination of Soviet archives then available, in particular the files of the Council of Religious
Affairs and its predecessors. Since my focus here is on the western perspective, I should note that subsequent more detailed
work by Russian scholars adds much detail and nuance (by regions in particular), and I will refer to some of it, but
Anderson offers a fair and sober survey that also seldom differs seriously from the work of earlier scholars who had to rely
on more limited data.
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policy toward religion makes clear,  the primary focus of state authorities was seldom on religion,4
rather on economics and on learning the best technology. Indeed, as a very recent examination of
the Soviet Union’s relations with its Warsaw Pact partners, and with China revealed, the most
persistent theme in the de facto policy was to catch up with the West, especially with the
technological advances of the new world power, the USA, and to use its east European partners
exploitatively to reach that end.5
When we compare and contrast the social visions of ancient Israel, of Christianity, and of
classic Marxism, all were rooted in Judeo-Christian social teaching. Recalling the main types of
social teaching suffices to alert us to what influenced Christian thinking during the 20  century inth
Russia. A common theme of Old and New Testament Biblical thinking, as pointed out by a Catholic
liberationist theologian from Mexico, Jose Miranda, was God’s persistent concern for justice.  This6
applied in particular to the marginalized of society who should be treated justly, which liberation
theologians summarized as “option for the poor”. The tense drama throughout the Biblical texts
and the entire history of Christianity so far, has revolved around the predilection of some leaders
of church and society to maintain their status and power, so that prophets often rose up to remind
them of God’s desire of justice for all.
In the early days of Christianity two key statements by the new followers of Jesus, have
provided the axis for debate on what kind of kingdom of God, or reign of God, Jesus had come to
announce. When the Jewish religious authorities, barely tolerated within the Roman empire,
demanded that the Jesus followers stop fostering what seemed to be a new religious movement,
the apostle Peter responded with the line, “we must obey God rather than any human authority”
(Acts 5:29). In his advice to the Christian community getting established in Rome, the seat of the
unfriendly empire, the apostle Paul urged that “every person be subject to the governing
authorities...” (Romans 13:1). For Christianity, the ideal bias has been toward radical trust in God,
and to trust in the power of love over all violence, as epitomized in the cross of Christ. The moral
dilemma for daily living was captured in the pithy remark by Jesus: “give unto Caesar what is
Caesar’s, give unto God what is God’s.” What should legitimately belong to Caesar’s realm, and
when must God’s reign supercede it?
Paradigms of Law and Legal Theory in Christian History for Today
At the beginning and at the end of the Soviet Union, there was talk about the need for law.
Tsarist law was arbitrary and contradictory, the principle of autocracy never gave way to
something like a constitutional monarchy. Hence a new concept of socialist law was attempted,
where the will of the people was to be primary. It got expressed in “peoples courts”. When in the
late 1970s the churches began to experience more toleration by the state, this was linked to a new
emphasis on “soviet legality” - that is, a social order more stable by basing it on the rule of law, no
longer as subject to the vagaries of political winds. Has the search for a new post-socialist legal
paradigm since 1990 found some consensus? Does not an acceptable post-communist church-state
paradigm depend on some broadly supported legal paradigm? Toward the end of his book John
Anderson noted that during the Perestroika years numerous discriminatory practices were quietly
dropped, such as the non-legal requirement for parents to register their passports before having
 Ibid.4
 Austin Hersild, “The Soviet State as Imperial Scavenger: “Catch Up and Surpass” in the Transnational Socialist5
Bloc, 1950-1960.” American Historical Review, Vol. 116, No. 1 (February 2011), 109-132.
 Josea Porfirio Miranda,. Marx and the Bible: A Critique of the Philosophy of Oppression, ed. & tr. John  Eagleson.6
Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1974; or his later Marx against the Marxists: The Christian Humanism of Karl Marx, ed. & tr. by
John Drury. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1980.
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their children baptized. Finally in 1989 the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) announced “that
the much criticized, unpublished instructions and decrees that it had issued between 1961 and 1983
were to be abrogated as incompatible with the principle of a law governed state.7
Unclear at the outset of the Soviet era were the corporate understandings. There was that
magical phrase, “all power to the soviets”, a democratic appeal that all decisions were to be by the
people. Yet it soon became clear that the pyramid of soviets (councils) were too easily manipulated
by a small power elite. Societies not part of the Soviet power structure (that is, not directly part of
the institutions that formed the state) soon lived in a kind of limbo. This was particularly true of
the churches, since the separation decree of 1918 denied the right of juridical personhood to any
and all churches. That right was partially permitted after 1944 through arbitrary instructions from
the CRA not anchored in law. When the right of juridical personhood was restored in 1990, in
practice it has been inadequate, and in the post-Soviet national laws, such as the Russian legislation,
the penchant for control from a governmental center has been  hard to eradicate.
So it may help to keep in mind the gradual history of development of notions of “societies”
(obshchestvo in Russian) that had in common some notion of corporate or ‘community’
understandings, but its theoretical underpinnings have been quite diverse. For Christianity, the
notions of a corporate body have been central - the church is to be the one body of Christ, with its
many members that differ but together constitute a united body, Christ as its head. The imagery
worth listing here includes the tension between the image of Christ its head, as the pantocrator, and
as the suffering Christ, the one who serves. The Orthodox tradition whose ethos still shapes Russian
imagination today, tended to imagine a structure of rulership, at the head of which were patriarchs
who were to exercise holy rule over the spiritual things, and there was to be a secular ruler, the
emperor, overseeing temporal matters as a good Christian. The imaginative term for that ideal state
on earth was ‘Simfonia”. Since the symphony was difficult to maintain, and even unthinkable
during the centuries of subordination to Muslim rule, even more unthinkable under atheist Soviet
rulers, the desire for a better church-state concept has long been obvious. Simfonia is unlikely in
the future.
The creative formation of a network of communities by Old Believers to survive over three
centuries, then the formation of a functional national network of communities by the Protestant
leaning free churches such as the Baptists, Evangelical Christians and Pentecostals, has been an
important social contribution now finally being noticed. Not only did it demonstrate, as early as
1905, the democratic capacities of the people (narod), that form of brotherhood (bratstvo) or
fellowship (obshchina) was flexible to adapt to the most sustained efforts to destroy and subvert, and
is still the source of strength and influence of the free churches in Russian society. Notable in this
regard is the repeated refrain in the posthumously published article by sectarian specialist
Klibanov, that it was the deep commitment to respect the human person, including the personhood
of one’s opponents, that not only accounted for the sectarian survival against great odds, but that
accounted for their record of social service. Klibanov’s frequent claim that Soviet officials (himself
included) were too blind to see, is salutary, even if coming rather late, but perhaps all will see better
in the future.8
 Anderson, p177. He cites numerous other such changes during “this changing legal context”.7
 The reference is to a manuscript found in Klibanov’s papers, presented at a conference in 1994, but only8
published as Aleksandr I. Klibanov, “The Work Ethic of Russian Old Believers”, in Georg B. Michels & Ro bert L. Nichols,
eds. Russia’s Dissident Old Believers 1650-1950, supplement to the Modern Greek Studies Yearbook, Minneapolis MN:
University of Minnesota, 2009, 97-120. Comparing Old Belief to the Spiritual Christians from which he traced the rise of
Baptists and other free churches, Klibanov noted that “their ethical codex, in particular, and especially their work ethic,
was based on the affirmation of the intrinsic value of the believer.” p113.
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Issues Raised by the 105 Year History of the Russian Baptist Legal Status
Soviet authorities and the new free churches both shared a vision for the separation of
church and state. The free churches were heirs to a longer tradition that had already been
challenging the way the new nation states of early modern Europe sought to dominate and control
the church. The left or radical wing of the western Reformation had resulted in numerous
alignments of congregations seeking to be free of state control. We now acknowledge that deep
desire for religious freedom, given the major spread of such churches around the globe in the past
two centuries of mission, by calling them free churches. The self-conscious theologies of church-
state relationships differed among them, but a common instinct was to sustain a clear expression
of separation between the religious commitments their members lived by and held each other
accountable to, and the way the variety of states they lived in, placed demands on their allegiance.
That is, the church-state relationship was an issue that must constantly remain contested.
What were the main contours of that contestation during the 20  century in Russia, andth
what have we learned from it? At least four chronological phases of change account for the
questions that follow:
1. What understanding of tolerance was the Tsarist Empire moving toward in 1905? Why? There
had been some discussion of tolerance (veroterpimost’) within the Dual Ministry under Alexander
I. The Dual Ministry combined a new ministry of education with a ministry of religious affairs, all
of it headed by Alexander N. Golitsyn, till then the Ober-Prokuror of the Orthodox Holy Synod
who had also taken on the direction of the Department of Foreign Confessions. Tolerance was
framed in the Pietism of the day, with its Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant expressions, or in the
joint cooperation in the Russian Bible Society. So it had a religious quality of appreciating the
spiritual values of the other, even as one stayed in the confessional tradition of one’s birth.
By the end of the 19  century the meaning of tolerance had changed. For key Orthodoxth
spokespersons, including its active missionary society, tolerance now was rooted in a philosophical
dismissal of doctrine and truth, and there was the expectation, which later statistical reports
confirmed, that after the toleration act of 1907, persons would leave Orthodoxy, some joining the
newly legalized Baptists, many others rejecting religion in general.  Nikol’skaia has provided many9
examples from the St. Petersburg region to show how actively the Baptists grew as a result. An
older western dissertation by Blane, relying more heavily on the papers of key Evangelical leaders
in the absence of access to state papers, drew attention to how much the law shaped the structural
formation of congregations, with their executive committees and record keeping. He too noted how
after 1909 a reaction to restrict those freedoms briefly experienced by the Evangelicals became a
reference point for their renewed activism after 1917.
2. Why was the first Soviet committee on religious affairs named the Liquidation (Likvidatsii)
Committee? What was the source of its thinking? That has remained more difficult to answer. Several
early dissertations, Blane and Steeves, cited the Soviet religious specialist Putintsev, who was an
atheist propagandist, for some of the thinking and work of early Soviet religious policy. Putintsev’s
work remained difficult to obtain outside the Soviet Union, I recall spending some days in Moscow
in 1994 finally able to read through his works and take notes. He obviously had access to some of
the early official reports. Then I began reading the files of the Committee of Liquidation and it still
 On this see, Tatiana Nikol’skaia, Russkii protestantiszm I gosudarstvennaia vlast’ v 1905-1991 godakh. St. Petersburg:9
European University in St. Petersburg, 2009, pp 26-29. In an earlier era, western scholar Andrew Q. Blane’s dissertation,
“The Relations Between the Russian Protestant Sects and the State, 1900-1921,” Duke University, 1964, had devoted his
second chapter to “The Advent of Religious Toleration” pp 40-72.
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proved difficult to explain the “likvidatsii” word. What was apparent was that the staff, starting
in early 1918 with one person spending some time looking for a typewriter and paper, were
entrusted with the task of executing the decree on separation of churches from the state and the
schools from the churches. Within a year part of their energies went to working out the
arrangements for the special permission of 1919, for sectarians to secure alternative to military
service status on the basis of making a credible claim for conscientious objection. Before that
committee’s files ended, it had dealt with numerous closures of mostly Orthodox parishes,
following general instructions sent out, and then needed to deal with appeals.
Tracing out the state structure for addressing religious matters before 1944 has been
difficult, and remains so.  The liquidation committee as central department for religious affairs
seems to have ceased functioning by the mid 1920s, perhaps as republican structures took over. By
then a functioning administrative structure for Russian Orthodoxy had become nearly impossible,
the treatment of the “successors” to Patriarch Tikhon were in and out of prison, and after a modus
vivendi was reached by locum tenens Sergei’s submission to Soviet power in 1927, he still lacked
most of the instruments for leading the church, apart from some symbolic acts. Similarly the testing
of each of the evangelical unions - Baptist, Evangelical Christian, Pentecostal, Mennonites,
Adventist - over the issues of a loyalty statement and abandoning claims of conscientious objection
to military service, ended with leadership greatly restrained, even though the efforts at evangelism,
mission, offering theological education persisted in some regions. In all of this the church
representatives noted the hand of the secret police, who were doing extensive surveillance, and
apparently had power and authority to carry out the varieties of harassment.  According to
Anderson’s findings, admittedly not comprehensive, the motives and theories for actions were not
evident, aside from securing Soviet power (or control by the Party general secretary) against all
potential opponents. In so doing, rights of persons, never mind the already absent right of juridical
personhood of the churches, were ignored. At most the Party debates, some reaching central
committee level, resulted in the Law on Cults of 1929 and the major program of church closures
that followed.
It was also the time of the rapid rise to influence of the League of Militant Godless, whose
key leaders might as well have been state officials, in terms of their capacity to speak for Soviet
policy on religion. Here too,  dissertations since 1991 by western scholars perusing state archives
gave a fuller picture of the League, and the ways it managed to win over former priests to help
expose church flaws.10
3. Did the Law on Cults of 1929 (which persisted, in spite of revisions till 1990) represent a change
in thinking? Were there parallels outside the USSR? The primary line of thinking, when noting the
simultaneous campaign of collectivization of agriculture and industry and what is often known as
the Stalinist war on religion were  the post NEP era renewed Party goal, ideologically driven, of
a rapid transformation of Russian society toward “full communism”. In that sense there were no
parallels, except that after World War II such societal transformations were attempted across
eastern Europe. The success in the latter cases was very uneven, the character and context of each
country, and of its religious makeup and legal traditions, produced a degree of diversity, and
revealed capacities for effective resistance that ultimately accounted for the collapse of the
communist projects.
 For example, Daniel Peris, Storming the Heavens. The Soviet League of the Militant Godless. Ithaca NY: Cornell10
University Press, 1998; and William B. Husband, Godless Communists, Atheism and Society in Soviet Russia, 1917-1932. Dekalb
IL: U of Northern Illinois Press, 2000.
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Many of the articles of the Law on Cults have often been referred to as existing in other
forms of government as well, notably in the west. For example, regulations on fire insurance of
public buildings, on regulated forms of self-governing societies needing statutes, annual meetings
for oversight of money and activities, or clarity on what deviant behavior was subject to civil law
or to criminal law. In most western countries, however, such laws and regulations applied to broad
categories of the general public, were not treated as part of a law on religion. If there was a partial
parallel, then one thinks of such countries as Germany, France, Austria or Switzerland, where
specific confessions with state church status had been fully free to function, and its clergy in the
modern era swore allegiance to king or constitution, but the state provided services such as
collection of a church tax, or the churches provided chaplains for the military. The role of minority
churches, or sects as many were labeled, was more difficult, with more restrictions. Gradually
through the democratization processes after both world wars, and the ethnic population shifts that
ensued, there was a steady transition to granting religious rights to minority groups and churches.
In contrast, after the Soviet state’s need to acknowledge the service of church leaders in the
Great Fatherland War, it was deemed necessary to establish a Council for the Affairs of the Russian
Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers, as well as a second Council for the Affairs of
Religious Cults that had responsibility for all other Christian confession, as well as Jews, Muslims
and other religions. This was a temporary adjustment to the strength of Orthodox sentiment as
Soviet leaders perceived things. By 1965 it was possible to integrate the two councils into the
Council of Religious Affairs (CRA), though with sections for some of the major groups of religious
traditions. This might be similar to the Ministry of Religious Affairs of 1817-24 under Golitsyn, as
I once pointed out, but the CRA was not shaped by a policy of religious tolerance toward all, with
the CRA merely the necessary liaison between the religions and the appropriate department of
government. After 1965 spokespersons for the CRA took pains to talk as if they were merely doing
liaison, but its actions, and published statements by leaders then, and as confirmed more
thoroughly from CRA reports to the Central Committee preserved in the archives examined by the
new scholars since 1991, the ideological intent was consistently one of the elimination of religion
from Russian society in the near future, and grudging toleration of some activities till that
eventuality.
4. One of the first official acts of the USSR was the decree on separation of churches from
the state. Its intent was to eliminate the influence of religious organizations from building the new
society. In various forms the struggle to overcome religious vestiges (or the war on religion, as it
was experienced by the churches, synagogues and mosques) persisted into the early phases of
Perestroika. What did it mean, therefore, that for some observers the vision for building a new civil society
was viewed as an essentially religious task (hence the rise of Soviet atheist rituals), whereas other scholars
argued that Soviet state treatment of the religions was not deemed important? 
Perhaps it is best to respond by pointing out that western as well as Soviet scholarship of
the time was shaped not only by cold war politics, or by the agenda of building communism, but
also by the personal background of the scholar. Western scholarship on the Soviet Union was long
dominated by exiles and their students whose political alignments were crucial, and whose interest
in religion as a factor in politics or world view formation was minimal. A minority of scholars
relying on more comparative social science perspectives began what came to be called revisionist
approaches to Soviet developments, differentiating among regions, among the administration
practices of different parts of government, etc. The influence of cultural anthropological studies in
third world mission finally showed an impact on re-examining the role of beliefs and practices
when applied to so-called secular Europe.
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The other general remark that space may allow here, is to note how little has been
published since 19991 on the role of religion, or of moral philosophy, on the transformations of
eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Given the recent flurry of anti-tolerance statements by a
sociologist in the employ of the Russian Orthodox Church, or the state committee on religious
affair’s readiness to reject the European Court’s call for granting legal registration of Roman
Catholics and Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia, it is obvious that the discourse within Orthodox
leadership appears to be shaped by fear of loss of influence, and with little familiarity with the
global shifts to an understanding of the right of religious belief and practice as basic to a healthy
society.11
5. How and why did Soviet policy differ from policies toward religion in eastern Europe, or in China,
southeast Asia and Ethiopia? An adequate response would require separate papers examining the
cultural factors in each region. Here I will restrict myself to a few general observations, intended
to draw attention to the transformations of populations during the 20  century.  Recent articles inth
the American Historical Review, the publication of an historical association for all historians working
in America, that attempted to review what the many publications on World Wars I and II have
achieved, drew attention to what the authors claimed was a neglected area of study. The eastern
front took many more lives, resulted in much more destruction of agriculture and industry, than
was true of the western front. This was true not only for the war against Nazi Germany and its
allies, it was also true for the first world war. The point of relevance here is that when Soviet power
emerged after 1917, the Tsarist empire, that had been noticeably dysfunctional since 1905,
essentially collapsed on itself. Until the mid 1920s, the Soviet leaders contended not only with a
civil war on three fronts, several of them were supported by western powers. So the sense of
external threat was acute, and the excessive treatment of Christian believers, who they thought
were more likely to be a fifth column making common cause with western powers, can be
understood that way. 
At the same time, the lack of serious inter-church relations between the Orthodox world
and western Catholic and Protestant worlds, and even more so the latter’s profound ignorance
about Christianity across eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, meant that the east European
churches lacked the instrumentality to resist state persecution, when compared with what had
changed by 1950. The emergence of the World Council of Churches, or of the Lausanne Movement,
to cite an Evangelical inter-church initiative, were largely driven by western Christian communities
and leaders. When Soviet church leaders began to get involved after 1961, they struggled for
decades under two disadvantages.  For one, Soviet peace policy coopted Soviet churchmen into
using what international church relations they could become part of to push a Soviet perspective
on the cold war. Secondly, Soviet churchmen had not been part of major moments of shared
reflection on international developments, nor had they many trained theologians and other experts
to be taken seriously by their western colleagues. When we look at what has changed since 1991,
that respect for competence has grown, a new generation is getting to know each other
internationally, even if the voice of Russians and neighboring countries is still a seldom heard
minority at international events such as the 2010 congresses on world mission.
Free Church Perceptions of the pre-Soviet, Soviet, and Post-Soviet Eras
Central to the uncertain actions of the Russian Baptist Union since 1991, as illustrative of
other free church unions in Russia and neighboring countries, has been the reality that so little
public discourse has taken place on reviewing the past, understanding the experience, and setting
 See Forum 18, a digital newsletter. March 2011.11
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directions for the future. So the recent conferences on history of the Baptist and other free church
traditions, held in Moscow and in Donetsk, or some of the discussions within gatherings of the
EAAA, must be seen as major and positive.  May that continue, and may what was discussed get12
widely circulated. Understandings and changes can then follow.
Two basic questions to probe further are: What has been problematic, and continues to be so?
What has earned respect? What I have learned in more than two decades of teaching global Christian
history, has been to notice how often, in the modern period, church leaders, or the leaders of new
church initiatives such as mission societies were energetic persons with great vision, but showing
little readiness to learn the background to the challenges they sought to overcome. What is also
obvious is that the watching world has tended to assess Christianity by the practices it noticed, not
its official theories or doctrines.
What has been problematic in Christian history is Christian practice, the lived out ethics
of faith. Surely that is because Christian faithful nevertheless remain flawed creatures, still prone
to sinfulness, including being driven more by one’s ego, than by submission to the will of Christ.
Even more so, the church’s institutions have often been the source of unfairness, of unjust privilege
to the strong and wealthy, less able to advocate for the poor and weak. Throughout modernity, the
“social question” has been a theme by which the historical performance of Christianity was
assessed. Marxist critique was particularly bitter against Christian churches’ inability to resolve the
social question so that justice would prevail. The past century of Marxist/Communist attempts to
resolve the social question better, in the end produced results even more ambiguous than the
Christian record. Across eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the public by 1990 had begun to look
to the Christians and to the churches with respect on matters of morality and the social question
in general. Two decades later, as recent social studies appear to show, the public is less positive
toward the churches.
Key to the free church tradition was the emphasis on believers who had made a public
commitment to Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord. Free church practice placed great emphasis on
mutual accountability for high moral behavior, and practiced discipline of its members. By 1986
it was common to hear comments in Soviet circles of respect for the quality of life of the sektanty,
including the Old Believers, and those more familiar with them realized also that those believers
included many of great intellectual ability and skills. Further, love of neighbor, and love of enemy,
as Jesus called for, were part of that desired lived ethic, but difficult to practice when Soviet policy
between 1929 and 1991 forbad organized charity and mission, or any social/political involvement.
Yet the teaching and tradition did not disappear, so charity and mission  societies appeared
everywhere after 1991. It was a time of creative engagement with the social ills of society. Both
Orthodox and Protestant scholars from the West and from Russia turned to the first part of the 20th
century for wisdom on what might be recovered.  Perhaps one of the negative features in the13
patterns that developed during the 1990s, was the positive fact of financial and moral support from
 The reference is to a conference held in Moscow, October 18-19, 2007, to review 140 years of the Russian Baptist12
tradition, 21 presenters from within the tradition, that can be deemed to precede the conference of April 3-5, 2011 in
Moscow, where this paper was presented. Between 2007 and 2010, Donetsch Christian University sponsored annual
scholarly conferences in spring, titled Pomnyi ves Put’ (Remembering the Whole Story) that focused on reconciling the
histories of the Evangelical Christian Baptist unions and associations that had parted ways during the Soviet pressures on
religion. Another publication, Sharyl Corrado & Toivo Pilli, eds. Eastern European Baptist History: New Perspectives,
published by International Baptist Theological Seminary, Prague, 2007, contained papers from a 2005 conference, where
the presenters included a few western specialists and the new scholars from the former Soviet Union working at advanced
degrees.
 For example, Adele Lindenmeyr, Poverty Is Not a Vice: Charity, Society and the State in Imperial Russia. Princeton:13
Princeton University Press, 1996.
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free church bodies in the west, that too readily became a negative dependance when the economy
collapsed. The challenge to a building up of church structures supported and sustained by its
committed members still seems very daunting, though one can detect progress. 
The lived social ethic of free churches should not be taken for granted. Currently in USA
books have appeared for Evangelical readers that present the significance of church community
action as almost a new discovery, by stressing to highly individualist believers that one’s Christian
faith cannot be lived out without the help of fellow believers - it takes a church or congregation.
So too in Russia, the influences since 1991 from western Christianity have been biased toward the
individual, insufficiently toward church cohesion and witness. The forms of mutual aid long
practiced de facto in the Soviet years were what earned respect, and deserve to be emulated in the
future. 
 
The Relevance of Human Rights
The initial commitment of the new Soviet leaders to breaking down the institutional power
of the Russian Orthodox church as bastion of counter-revolution, has puzzled those scholars who
knew about the variety of reform, renewal or renovation movements within that church. But in
international terms, Orthodoxy had for centuries been essentially unknown in the West, and
generally speaking, liberal and socialist thinkers alike dismissed Orthodox thought as irrelevant,
as they thought Roman Catholic theology to be. The ‘socialism’ that took power in 1917 was after
all a form of westernization in its intellectual foundations. By the time of the “thaw” (the western
label for the slow process of revisionism in the USSR after the death of Stalin) a new theme about
human rights had taken on more international significance than even the framers of the Declaration
on Human Rights (1948) had envisioned. Human rights theory is currently being reconsidered from
many angles, to explore its relevance for the 21  century, and we must therefore also identify itsst
influence on church and state thinking and practice in post-communist Russia.
Parts of the Russian intelligentsia became involved with human rights movements, some
concerned for artistic freedom of expression, some seeking a Marxism with a human face, and some
seeking the restoration of national rights, some of religious rights. The common experiences of
suffering imprisonment and other harassment  by the resistant Soviet state had resulted in
recognition of mutual concerns and respect, even for the free church activists who seldom saw
themselves as part of the intellectual elite. What role, therefore, did the human rights movements
play in the transition to post-communist society?
Specifically with reference to the Russian Baptists, how do we evaluate the human rights
dynamic for the post-communist years? It was the dissident Russian Baptist movement, that we in
the West labeled the Reform Baptists (usually referred to within Russia as Sovet Tserkvei) that relied
the most on human rights appeals to the UN, to the WCC, and above all to public opinion via the
popular press in the west about specific claims of violation of human and religious rights. Yet in
the post-communist decades the Reform Baptists have remained the most reluctant to make
common cause in searching for a social order of religious pluralism.
Soviet officials tended to stress that social and communal rights were more vital than
individual rights, and there was a critique among Christian theologians in the west who saw
appeals to human rights as rooted in the excessive individualism emerging from the philosophical
Enlightenment of the 18  century. Yet the 50  anniversary of the Declaration on Human Rightsth th
triggered some rethinking, that drew attention to the much longer tradition of the right to dignity
and freedom of human beings that were created in the image of God. In an illuminating assessment
of what  Samuel Moyn called “The First Historian of Human Rights”, the Luther specialist Gerhard
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Ritter had published an essay in 1949 in the prestigious German journal, Historische Zeitschrift. It
was ignored as too religious and conservative, but Moyn, who just completed a book on the
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, took him seriously. Ritter remarked that having “experienced
a reality without human rights”, “now we know ... that the premises of human rights are valid,...
on human rights depends... whether life on this old European continent will remain worth living.”14
Moyn claimed that it was “because it preserved the inward moral sphere that religious freedom
emerged as the first of all human rights.”15
A western perspective on the recovery of human rights since 1989 or 1993, has been shaped
by the by now widely known and studied Truth and Reconciliation Commission of post-Apartheid
South Africa, and by the more ambiguous Truth and Reconciliation processes in a few Latin
American countries when their national security states were reformed. A systematic review of
violations of human rights had started in Russia and several neighboring post-Communist states,
but the societal reconciliation theme was soon sidelined, the defensive postures of the Yeltsin and
Putin governments have resulted in too frequent violations of human rights, including religious
rights, and restricting access to key archives again. The absence of violence and demands for
revenge from the long suppressed religious communities, has often been noted, they understood
their theology to require a stance of forgiveness and offering hope for the future. Perhaps the
scholarship from within that region, will soon foster more discourse on the necessity of religious
freedom as human right, in order for a society to make much progress toward the “good society”
visoin and for church-state relationships that flow from such premises.
 Samuel Moyn, “The First Historian of Human Rights,” American Historical Review, February 2011, 58-79, p.62.14
 Ibid p63.15
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